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Introduction
The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), released in four volumes during 
2007, provides a commanding summary of  
global knowledge about climate change1. It 
covers the scientific basis of  climate change, 
its potential impacts, and response options 
through adaptation, mitigation and their 
links with sustainable development (IPCC, 
2007a, b, c, d).
The AR4 added significant momentum to international 
negotiations, and the United Nations climate change 
conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 is tasked 
with hammering out a new global agreement based on AR4 
conclusions (UNFCCC, 2007). The IPCC was also awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007, jointly with Al Gore, for its 
efforts in building up and disseminating knowledge related 
to climate change and possible responses. In bestowing this 
award the Nobel Committee recognised that climate change 
is rapidly moving from an environmental issue to one of  
economic and international security.
While the AR4 is widely regarded as the most authoritative 
and comprehensive assessment of  climate change science 
and relevant response options, it is nonetheless a snapshot in 
time, since it is based on peer-reviewed literature published 
up to about the end of  2006. This article aims to provide an 
update on two particular areas of  research where significant 
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developments have occurred, and on their 
policy implications. These two areas are, 
on one hand, recent information on the 
risk of  an accelerated rise in sea level from 
the loss of  polar ice, and on the other 
hand, increasing evidence that the window 
of  opportunity to stabilise greenhouse gas 
concentrations at low levels is closing rapidly. 
Both areas have important implications 
for global and national policies to address 
climate change, including the interaction of  
climate policies with government responses 
to the global economic crisis.
The growing commitment to future climate 
change and its impacts
A fundamental message from the recent 
IPCC assessment is that current emissions 
of  long-lived greenhouse gases, particularly 
CO2, are creating a legacy that will last 
for millennia. About 20% of  all CO2 
emitted into the atmosphere today will 
remain there for more than 1,000 years 
(IPCC, 2007d). The warming effect of  
those emissions on the climate is essentially 
irreversible over many human generations, unless we actively 
remove CO2 from the atmosphere. Techniques for doing so 
exist in principle, but their environmental and economic 
feasibility and sustainability at sufficiently large scales are at 
best speculative at present (IPCC, 2007c; also, for example, 
Broecker, 2007; Boyd, 2008; Marland and Obersteiner, 2008; 
Read, 2008).
In addition, some components of  the climate system, in 
particular the world’s oceans and polar ice sheets, take a long 
time to respond to the heating effect of  greenhouse gases. 
This inertia means that even if  greenhouse gas concentrations 
could be held constant at today’s levels, the atmosphere would 
continue to warm for more than a century by about another 
0.6°C, and sea level would continue to rise for a thousand 
years or more (IPCC, 2007d).
Unfortunately, holding greenhouse gas concentrations 
constant at today’s levels is an entirely hypothetical scenario, 
as it would require an immediate, large and sustained drop 
in global emissions of  CO2 and other long-lived greenhouse 
gases. More gradual emissions reductions inevitably lead 
to further increases in greenhouse gas concentrations and 
associated climate change. Even the most ambitious scenario 
for emissions reductions assessed by the IPCC, where global 
CO2 emissions peak by about 2015 and decline to almost 
zero by 2100, would still lead to temperature increases of  
about 2°C above pre-industrial levels, or about another 
1.5°C above average 1980–1999 temperatures. For such 
an amount of  warming, sea level would rise inexorably for 
many centuries by 0.4-1.2m from thermal expansion alone, 
with additional contributions from melting of  glaciers and 
ice caps and possibly several metres due to loss of  parts of  the 
polar ice sheets. Greater delays in emissions 
reductions imply even higher greenhouse 
gas concentrations and consequently 
greater temperature increases and long-
term sea level rise (IPCC, 2007a).
Apart from climate change itself, recent 
studies show that some of  its impacts 
are also likely to be irreversible. For 
example, 20–30% of  all species assessed 
so far are projected to be at an increased 
risk of  extinction once global average 
temperatures rise by 2–3°C above pre-
industrial levels. For temperature increases 
above 4°C, ecosystem models project 
extinctions around the globe of  40–70% 
of  species assessed. Some key ecosystems 
are at high risk even within the next few 
decades, for example coral reefs and the 
sea ice biome (IPCC, 2007c, a; Eisenman 
and Wettlaufer, 2009; Silverman et al., 
2009).
Some other key impacts would be 
effectively irreversible at least over many 
human generations. For example, warming 
of  only another 1°C is expected to increase 
water stress for hundreds of  millions of  people, mainly in 
subtropical regions due to a combination of  reduced rainfall, 
rising temperatures and the shrinkage of  glaciers in the Andes, 
Himalayas and European alps. For temperatures above 3°C, 
the number of  additional people affected by water stress is 
projected to be above one billion. Many of  those impacts are 
projected to emerge at very low levels of  warming; indeed, 
regional warming observed over the past three decades has 
already affected many natural systems on all continents and 
most oceans (IPCC, 2007c).
Solomon et al. (2009) confirmed that sea level rise and 
rainfall reductions in many already dry parts of  the world 
would be essentially irreversible over at least the next 1,000 
years even if  CO2 emissions are stopped entirely after the year 
2100. The magnitude of  those persistent changes crucially 
depends on CO2 emissions (and/or efforts to reduce those 
emissions) during the 21st century. 
In light of  this information, it is by now a distinct 
understatement to say that climate change requires a 
‘precautionary response’, since this phrase implies much 
greater uncertainty about the negative consequences of  
climate change than there is. The nature of  science lies in 
efforts to understand and reduce uncertainties. The image 
that therefore often emerges in the public arena is one where 
scientists discuss, and sometimes argue about, recent research 
and its implications. Since the remainder of  this article aims 
to contribute to this debate, it seems necessary to state up 
front that even just those climate change projections that we 
already have very high confidence in (e.g. impacts on water 
security and some key ecosystems, and long-term sea level 
rise from thermal expansion alone) require urgent, global 
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and sustained emissions reductions to keep those impacts 
within (barely) manageable limits. The more recent scientific 
findings discussed below only add to the urgency of  such 
measures.
Opening floodgates: recent studies relating to sea level rise
Rising sea levels present a significant risk to infrastructure 
around the world. The thermal inertia of  oceans and the 
polar ice sheets implies that sea level would rise inexorably 
for many centuries in a warmer world as the ocean water 
warms up and expands, and land-based ice continues to 
melt. For this reason, projections of  sea level rise in the long 
term (i.e. many centuries into the future) are generally much 
higher than increases projected by the year 2100. Indeed, the 
last time the Earth was a few degrees warmer than at present 
for an extended period (about 125,000 years ago), sea levels 
were 4 to 6m higher, mainly from the loss of  polar ice (IPCC, 
2007d). 
Given the unavoidability of  rising sea levels in a warming 
world, the critical question is only partly how much sea level 
will rise; it is also how quickly any given rise might be realised: 
how much may occur within the next 100 years (the lifetime 
of  an individual house) or over the next millennium (the 
lifetime of  large coastal cities). The rate of  change is critical 
since it will influence the ability to respond without major 
social and economic upheavals in highly developed coastal 
regions.
Based on current models and for the highest emissions 
scenario, the AR4 found that sea levels would rise by up 
to about 59cm by the end of  the 21st century.2 However, 
the AR4 warned that sea level rise could exceed this rate 
because these projections do not include uncertainties due to 
feedbacks between the climate system and the global carbon 
cycle, nor the possible further acceleration of  the flow of  
glaciers that drain the polar ice sheets. Such acceleration 
has been observed during the past decade where glaciers 
lost their buttressing ice shelves, but is not 
incorporated into current models because 
the understanding of  the relevant processes 
is too limited. The AR4 noted that if  the 
enhanced ice flow from Greenland and 
Antarctic glaciers were to increase linearly 
with temperature, this would add another 
10 to 20cm to sea level by the end of  the 
21st century, but greater increases could 
not be ruled out if  the enhanced loss of  
polar ice accelerates non-linearly with 
rising temperatures (IPCC, 2007d).
Numerous studies published since 
the AR4 have attempted to understand 
and quantify this potential additional 
contribution of  polar ice sheets to sea 
level rise. These recent studies point 
to a potentially significant additional 
contribution from dynamic ice sheet 
discharge, which could increase total sea 
level rise by 2100 to between about 70 and 160cm, although 
even 2m cannot be ruled out entirely.
These studies used a range of  techniques, including the 
empirical correlation between temperature and sea level 
observed during the 20th century (Rahmstorf, 2007; Horton 
et al., 2008); efforts to quantify potential rates of  ice loss 
from polar glaciers based on observed mechanisms (see, for 
example, Das et al., 2008; Holland et al., 2008; Joughin et al., 
2008; Pfeffer et al., 2008; Rignot et al., 2008; Stearns et al., 
2008; Nick et al., 2009); and observed rates of  sea level rise 
the last time the Earth entered a warm interglacial period 
(Rohling et al., 2008; Blanchon et al., 2009).
There is as yet insufficient convergence or technical 
consistency amongst those studies to assign probabilities 
to any of  the recent higher projections, let alone provide a 
‘best estimate’ – a wide range of  possible answers remains. 
It is worth noting, though, that none of  the recent studies 
suggests sea level rise at the lower end of  the range given in 
the AR4. The most robust information that can be drawn 
from the recent studies is that at present, the quantitative 
range presented in the AR4 should probably be regarded as 
a lower bound, and no specific figure represents a reliable 
upper bound for sea level rise by the year 2100 (Alley et al., 
2008).
Implications of sea level rise uncertainties for policy 
responses
The relevance of  these recent studies for coastal planning 
depends to some extent on the nature and lifetime of  relevant 
coastal infrastructure. The lack of  a robust upper bound of  sea 
level rise forces us to evaluate infrastructure developments for 
their ability to adapt to sea level rise if  and when any particular 
level may be realised. In other words, adaptation to sea level 
rise may need to be adjusted as necessary over time rather 
than designed to cope with a specific maximum sea level rise 
by a specific date. This ‘adaptive management’ approach 
has been employed in planning for the 
Thames (UK) estuary and is beginning to 
be incorporated in government guidance 
on climate change in the UK (DEFRA, 
2006; Ramsbottom and Reeder, 2008).
In New Zealand, technical guidance 
on sea level rise for local authorities 
recognises the uncertainties in sea level rise 
and suggests the need to evaluate a range 
of  scenarios and to consider the potential 
for adaptation to sea level rise in excess 
of  any default assumption (Ministry for 
the Environment, 2008, Table 2.2 and 
Figure 2.8). However, local-scale decision-
making processes might struggle to follow 
such an adaptive management approach 
unless they are provided with additional 
central government guidance regarding 
the fundamental principles and priorities 
that need to be applied (see, for example, 
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Environment Waikato, 2008a; LGNZ, 
2008).
Adaptation requirements will also 
depend on the level of  risk that communities 
are prepared to accept. For example, 
building infrastructure that can be adapted 
to a sea level rise of  0.5m but not to 1m 
or more is not necessarily ‘wrong’ (since 
sea level may rise no more than 0.5m over 
the next century), but it clearly is a risky 
proposition in light of  the recent scientific 
evidence. Whether such risks are worth 
taking, and who should bear the related 
costs and benefits, cannot be answered by 
science but requires a societal debate and 
political decisions that are informed by 
science.
In the context of  urban settlements, 
specific time horizons for planning 
and consent processes carry their own 
problems. While individual buildings 
and infrastructure have a limited (albeit 
long) lifetime, settlements per se usually 
exist for many centuries. They will have 
to deal with an inexorable further rise in 
sea levels beyond 2100 in a warmer world. At some stage, 
retreating rather than protecting them from the rising sea 
will almost certainly become the only option. However, a 
regulatory framework with adequate technical and financial 
support that would allow the widespread and consistent 
practical implementation of  ‘managed retreat’ remains to 
be developed. In the absence of  such a national framework, 
the combination of  ‘existing use rights’ and inevitable local 
conflicts between public and private benefits and costs of  
protecting either infrastructure or the natural character 
of  the coast create significant challenges (see, for example, 
Environment Waikato, 2008a, b). These challenges can only 
intensify over time as sea level continues to rise.
Sea level rise presents a challenge not only for adaptation 
policies but also for global climate agreements concerned 
with emissions reductions. Even though it may be technically 
feasible to adapt to sea level rise of  several metres for some 
countries over the next few centuries, this is very unlikely to be 
implemented effectively given the scale of  the challenge, and 
it would come at enormous social and environmental costs. 
Developing countries in particular would have neither the 
financial, economic or technical resources nor governance 
systems to deal with changes of  this magnitude (IPCC, 2007c, 
chapters 17 and 19). This means that the risks associated with 
sea level rise on the scale of  several metres can in practical 
terms only be reduced significantly by limiting the emissions 
of  greenhouse gases and resulting long-term climate change 
itself.
The AR4 already noted that one of  the reasons for 
increased concern about climate change is exactly the fact 
that we do not have a good understanding of  how much sea 
level rise could accelerate over the 21st 
century. The most recent research on sea 
level rise confirms this perspective and 
places climate policy decisions squarely in 
a risk-management framework: the need 
to reduce emissions is driven not only by 
those impacts that we can foresee already 
with a reasonable degree of  certainty; it 
is made even more urgent by the need to 
avoid potential impacts that may have a 
lower probability (or where we have lower 
levels of  confidence in projections) but that 
would have catastrophic effects on human 
well-being and ecosystems on a global scale 
if  realised (Stern, 2006, IPCC, 2007a; 
Weitzman, 2009).
Closing windows: pathways to climate 
stabilisation
Even though recent scientific developments 
suggest that stabilisation targets even 
lower than those evaluated by the IPCC 
may be desirable, recent greenhouse gas 
emissions trends suggest that the window 
of  opportunity to stabilise greenhouse gas 
concentrations at low levels and costs is closing fast.
The AR4 evaluated a large number of  integrated 
assessments of  the global macroeconomic cost of  reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and stabilising CO2-equivalent 
concentrations. The lowest stabilisation level evaluated in 
the AR4 was for concentrations of  440 to 490ppm CO2-
equivalent. Limiting the increase in concentrations to such 
a level would require global emissions of  CO2 to peak by 
about 2015, decline to about 50–85% below 1990 levels by 
the year 2050, and fall further to almost zero emissions in 
2100 (IPCC, 2007b). As discussed above, this level would 
still result in long-term warming of  about 2°C relative to 
pre-industrial temperatures and some significant associated 
impacts, especially in the most vulnerable regions.
The AR4 also provided information on the near-term 
emissions targets that developed and developing countries 
would have to achieve by 2020 if  they want to remain 
consistent with this stringent mitigation pathway. A large 
variety of  metrics was used to compare mitigation targets for 
various country groups, taking their different financial and 
technological capacities, historical responsibilities for climate 
change, and general state of  development into account. 
Based on these metrics, the AR4 found that developed 
countries listed in Annex I of  the UNFCCC (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change) would need to 
reduce their collective emissions by 25–40% below 1990 levels 
by 2020, while developing countries would need to reduce 
their collective emissions to substantially below business-as-
usual (i.e. below emissions in the absence of  any mitigation 
measures) by the same date (IPCC, 2007b, Table 13.7).
Recent analyses have confirmed the robustness of  this 
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analysis in principle, and also clarified that the ‘substantial’ 
reduction from business-as-usual for developing countries 
would need to amount to about 10–30% by 2020 (den Elzen 
and Höhne, 2008). Given the vastly different development 
stages amongst developing countries, this implies even 
stronger emissions limitations for the most advanced 
developing countries and more relaxed (or no) limitations on 
least developed countries.
A suite of  recent studies pointed out that the ability to follow 
such a global mitigation path is rapidly disappearing, because 
emissions from developing countries have accelerated over 
recent years while concurrently many developed countries 
failed to halt the growth in their emissions. The reasons for 
these trends include the increased global investment in coal-
fired power generation, the aspiration of  middle classes in 
many developing countries to reach living standards of  the 
developed world, and failure in many countries to implement 
a clear price on carbon emissions and/or policies that could 
overcome market failures and social or information barriers 
(IPCC, 2007b; Anderson and Bows, 2008; den Elzen and 
Höhne, 2008; Lankao et al., 2008; Meinshausen and Hare, 
2008; Sheehan, 2008; van Vuuren and Riahi, 2008).
The potential rate of  future emissions reductions 
is constrained fundamentally by the lifetime of  capital 
infrastructure, which has a turnover rate of  about 1-3% per 
annum. The global diffusion of  low-carbon technology is 
therefore expected to take many decades even if  investment 
in such technologies is made financially attractive or the 
cost of  such technologies falls below that of  current carbon-
intensive options (IPCC, 2007b, chapter 11). This applies 
particularly to developed economies that are unlikely to 
undergo major growth in new power generation but rather 
gradually transform their existing generation. Decarbonising 
the economies of  developed countries at rates in excess of  
1–3% per year over extended periods will therefore only be 
possible if  existing infrastructure is retired prematurely in 
favour of  new low-carbon technologies, or by retro-fitting 
existing installations (e.g. with carbon 
capture and storage technology). Either of  
those options usually results in significantly 
higher costs. Nonetheless, delays of  
only a few more years in achieving real 
emissions reductions will make sustained 
decarbonisation rates in excess of  3% per 
year necessary if  low concentration targets 
are to be attained. Such delays will therefore 
saddle future generations with escalating 
mitigation costs and/or increasing impacts 
from climate change and increasing risk of  
catastrophic events.
Implications of recent emissions and 
economic trends for climate policy
Even though the required scale of  emissions 
reductions relative to business-as-usual 
may appear significant, macroeconomic 
modelling indicates that if  a price on carbon were implemented 
globally now, stringent emissions reductions would reduce 
growth in global GDP by less than 0.12 percentage points 
per year on average until 2050 (IPCC, 2007b). However, 
costs for specific countries, sectors and over more limited time 
periods could deviate significantly from this long-term global 
average. Concerns about the uneven or unfair distribution 
of  costs amongst different parts of  society therefore continue 
to make it difficult to implement effective policies that would 
achieve a globally optimal outcome at lowest cost.
The current global economic crisis is likely to put a 
short-term dent in the otherwise relentless growth of  
global emissions.3 However, if  policy packages to stimulate 
ailing economies focus on traditional and hence carbon-
intensive infrastructure projects, the longer-term effect of  
economic recovery is likely to see rapid further growth in 
global emissions once national economies recover, and the 
additional carbon-intensive infrastructure would be locked 
into place for many more decades.
Earlier analysis suggested that the window of  opportunity 
to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations at low levels is 
closing fast; if  economic recovery over the next few years 
is fuelled by investments in carbon-intensive infrastructure, 
such investments would slam this window firmly shut for the 
rest of  this century.
Fortunately, a recent analysis (Edenhofer and Stern, 
2009) gives some hope. The stimulus packages of  the G20 
nations have devoted significant fractions of  their new 
and redirected funds to green investments. Of  the roughly 
US$2,160 billion in economic stimulus packages unveiled so 
far, the tentative analysis by Edenhofer and Stern suggests 
that about US$400 billion are directed at areas that reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, for example through investments 
in energy efficiency in buildings, renewables and associated 
upgrades to networks, transport systems, and water and waste 
management. These investments are expected to capitalise on 
reduced labour costs and provide training and employment 
opportunities, while at the same time 
reducing direct immediate and longer-
term costs due to reduced greenhouse gas 
emissions and energy demand combined 
with increased energy security.
Edenhofer and Stern (2009, pp.6 and 
12) argue that:
providing a stimulus to the economy 
and protecting the climate do not 
stand in opposition to each other. 
… Ensuring that national recovery 
programmes are ‘green’ makes sense 
not only because climate change 
poses a far more serious threat to 
the global economy in the long 
term than do temporary economic 
downturns. It makes sense because 
otherwise, once the world economy 
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recovers, sharply increasing energy 
prices are likely at some stage to trigger 
subsequent slowdowns. Without the 
transition towards a low-carbon global 
energy system, the next economic crisis 
is pre-programmed. ‘Green’ recovery 
programmes are not only an option for 
sound and effective crisis relief; they are 
a precondition.
The investment derivatives that 
supported the housing bubble were driven 
by hypothetical ‘business-as-usual’ returns, 
but this expectation was itself  based on a 
decade of  unusual growth in the housing 
sector that has now been brought to an 
abrupt halt. Non-transparent investment 
vehicles hid the escalating risk from 
investors. The key challenge for public 
policy now is to establish a more sustainable 
platform for economic recovery, and 
to ensure that the hunt for short-term 
economic returns does not saddle the next 
generation with escalating risks arising 
from climate change and ‘toxic assets’ in 
the form of  carbon-intensive industries. 
Making the structural adjustments in 
national economies required for significant and sustained 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions was never going to be 
easy. Nonetheless, the current economic crisis could prove to 
be a blessing in disguise if  governments use the opportunity 
to guide the transition into a carbon-constrained world, and 
avoid the creation of  yet another bubble that will again be 
pierced when yesterday’s ‘business-as-usual’ expectations 
begin to clash with fundamental external constraints.
New Zealand in the international context
This article would appear incomplete without at least a brief  
look at how New Zealand’s domestic approaches compare 
with these broad international trends and recent insights. It 
is noteworthy that most of  the fiscal stimulus in New Zealand 
consists of  tax cuts. Almost all other OECD countries seem to 
inject a much higher fraction of  their stimulus in response to 
the economic crisis through direct government investments. 
This includes significant ‘green’ packages that aim to deliver 
both employment and transformation of  energy demand 
and supply systems (Ban, 2009; Edenhofer and Stern, 2009; 
Kissel, 2009). Where additional direct investments are 
planned in New Zealand, there is as yet little evidence that 
the government is concerned with the potential lock-in effect 
of  investment in traditional infrastructure projects such as 
roading or thermal power generation, which commit New 
Zealand to further increases in greenhouse 
gas emissions as the economy recovers. At 
the same time, New Zealand is beginning 
to mount a case internationally that 
its projected growth in greenhouse gas 
emissions should be seen as a reason to 
also give it lighter future targets (see NZ, 
2009). If  this gamble fails, the hoped-for 
economic payback from tax-cut driven 
spending priorities and carbon-intensive 
infrastructure investments could quickly 
turn into a liability.
Opportunities for direct government 
investment abound that could deliver 
benefits in employment and in developing 
expertise, and that could at the same time 
contribute to the transformation of  our 
energy and transport supply and demand 
patterns. Relevant energy policies include 
training, employment and regulatory and 
financial support for small-scale renewables 
such solar hot water heating and enhanced 
housing insulation; feed-in tariffs for 
renewables such as solar photo-voltaics; 
and regulatory support for net metering. 
Investments in public and private transport 
infrastructure both can deliver short-term 
employment opportunities, but they create vastly different 
social, environmental and economic legacies through their 
associated carbon footprints, energy demands, social access 
to mobility and health co-benefits or trade-offs.
These potential benefits of  ‘green’ stimulus measures 
suggest a clear need for government agencies to analyse 
options for aligning economic recovery measures (tax cuts 
and direct government investments) with New Zealand’s 
strategic energy and transport goals. At the same time, it is 
clear that any private sector capital investments that may 
be stimulated by tax cuts can only contribute to long-term 
climate goals if  there is sufficient certainty about a price on 
carbon in the New Zealand economy. Urgent clarification 
and implementation of  the New Zealand Emissions Trading 
System can thus be regarded as a precondition, rather than a 
barrier, for sustainable future economic growth.
1 This article benefited from constructive comments from Jonathan Boston, Martin Manning, 
Judy Lawrence, Andrew Johnson and Blair Dickie. Naturally, all responsibility for emphasis, 
subjective judgements and any remaining errors rests entirely with the author. It also 
draws on discussions during the Copenhagen climate change congress in March 2009, 
which I attended with the aid of a joint travel grant from the Victoria University School of 
Government, Institute of Policy Studies and Climate Change Research Institute.
2  Whereas over many centuries, the AR4 found that sea level rise can be expected to exceed 
one metre even for the lowest emissions scenario that involves stringent greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions.
3  Between 1970 and 2004, overall CO2-equivalent emissions increased by about 70% and 
CO2 by about 80%. Under various business-as-usual scenarios, global CO2-equivalent 
emissions are projected to grow by another 25 to 90% until 2030 relative to the year 2000 
(IPCC 2007b).
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